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The Bandung Conference: 1ìiumph of Diplomacy 
Sug매an 뻐ng H없삐ckColI명e 
When the Bandung Conference of Asian and African Nations met in 때ril 아 1955, 
the Korean War had bæn brought to an inconclusive ending two yl없rs earlier, 뀌le 
Korean pe미nsula remained divided, and there was no peace treaty between the 
warnng pa에es ， which included the People’s Republic of China, The following year, 
1954, the French were routed at Dienbienphu just as a great-power conference got 
under way in Geneva to decide the future of Vietnam , The pace of de-colonization in 
Asia and A에ca was a subject of overriding interest to the delegates at Bandung, 
many of whom had experienced the sting of colonialism in a very personal way, Bul 
lhe Uniled States saw lhe conference mainly as a lhreal 10 American interests 
largely because of the inclusion of Communist China as a participant. When lhe 
weeklong conference ended one diplomat was widely acclaimed as its preeminent 
statesman, credited w~h the remarkable feat of tuming this unrehearsed, one-of-a-
kind diplomatic venture into an unqualified success: Premier Zhou Enlai of the 
People’ s Republic of China, That was 311 the more remarkable because Zhou had, 
in all probability, been the target of a bungled American assassination plot, and he 
was inlensely conscious of it , Zhou’ s quiet accomplishments at the Bandung 
Conference were, 10 be sure, a credit to his embat1led regime back in Beijing, whose 
human rights violations continued to inspire scom abroad, But, just as importantly, 
Zhou’ s political skills were a powerful vindicalion of mature diplomacy as an 
instrument of foreign policy, 
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I 
On April 18th, 1955, delegates from twenty-nine Asian and Atìican nations gathεred at 
Bandung, Indonesia, for a weeklong conference to compare notes on a wide range of issues 
that affected their peoples. With a combined population of 1.4 billion, representing five-eighths 
of the human race, these Asian and African nations had earned the right to be heard. And the 
nations needed to speak with one voice if they wεrε to be understood as a group. 
When the delegates wrapped up their work on the seventh day, the 25th, unanimously 
affixing their signatures to a long communiqué pledging cooperation in the cause of freedom 
and peace, it was evident that the conference had gone wεll. Even the skeptical American prlεss 
seemed to bε impressed by the progress the conference had madε， after having initially 
portrayed it as a neutralist sellout to the communist bloc. What would these former colonies do 
next, now that thεy had tasted the thrill of diplomacy as independent soverlζign states? 
11 
The conference had been call잉 the year before by five neighboring countries of south Asia-
India, Ceylon, Indonesia, Burma and Pakistan - meeting in the Ceylonese capital of 
Colombo. Of these, four were non-align떠 nations in the Cold War and one, Pakistan, was a 
rnilitary ally of the United States. None was a communist state. And yet, the United States 
looked upon the planned conference with deep rnisgivings. It wasn’t so much the audacity of 
these new players on the world scene staging a big show without American blessing but, 
rather, the company they were inclined to keep that irritated the American leaders. 
Contrary to popular misperception, the adjective “non-aligned" was never used by thε 
sponsoring nations in any of its official communications. It didn’t become p없t of a conference 
title until Yugoslavia’ s Marshal Tito hosted a contìεrεnce at Belgradε in Septεmbεr 1961 , 
which was followed by its sequel at Cairo in October 1964. The event at Bandung was simply 
a gathering of “ Asian and African nations." 
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While not all of the Asian and African states were invited, the list of participants had several 
of America’s staunch allies such as the Philippines and Pakistan, both members of the South 
East Asia Treaty Organization, the anti-communist military alliance formεd at the instigation 
of the United States in Septεmber the previous year. These nations certainly could not have 
been included in any gathering that called itself “nonaligned". But the Colombo Five did invite 
the People’s Republic of China, which the United States refused to recognize. And therein lay 
the source of American irritation. 
President Dwight D. Eisenhower and his secr，εtary of state, John Foster Dulles, were always 
extremely polite to, and respectful of, Jawaharlal Nehru, the prime minister of India, who was 
widely perceived as the driving force behind the Bandung undertaking. But the two American 
statesmen never thought kindly of Nεhru’ s incessant demands for bringing the People’s 
Republic of China into the United Nations as a replacement for the Nationalist govemment 
now in exile on Taiwan. Because of all thε εconomic aid India was then getting from the 
United States, this independent line was offensivε to somε in the Unitεd States, in and out of 
foreign policy officialdom. Columnist David Lawrence, for one, once wεnt so far as to urge 
that the United States stop wasting its foreign aid money on “ immoral" regimεs likε Nehru’s 
India. And when the American leaders found out that the People’s Republic of China had been 
invited by thε Colombo Powers to participate at this conference they quickly recognized 
Nehru’s fingerprints. Or, at least, they thought thεyhad. 
Eisenhower and Dulles were apprehεnsive that Premier Zhou would try to rally the 
developing nations' support for his “ peaceful coexistence" idea, having had his considerable 
diplomatic skills tested at the Geneva conference on Indochina the previous year. And the 
Chinεse diplomat would get plenty of support from the likes of Nehru, U Nu of Burma and 
Gamal Abdel Nasser, the dashing young Egyptian 따myofficεr， now prime minister, who had 
three years earlier launched a bloodless coup in his homeland, sending King Farouk into exile. 
In the unfolding contest of ideas the United States would find itself at the receiving-εnd， forced 
to dεcide whεther or not to endorse someone else’s product, this one a new vision for peace 
widely advertised as made in China 
There wasn’t really much the United States could do under these circumstances. No one in 
Asia, much less Africa, was trying to pick a fight with thε Unitεd States, not even Communist 
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China, and the United States could ill-afford to behavε like an irritable bully when everyone 
else was srniling and holding up peace signs. On the other hand, sitting tight, waiting, doing 
nothing, likε a good Taoist sage, was never an idea that appealed to many American leaders, so 
accustomed to taking charge. Evεn in times of doubt and uncertainty, doing “ something" was 
the preferred way, lest they be judged indecisive. 
Just a week before the opening day at Bandung Secretary of State Dulles warned his nation 
that peace could be a dangerous commodity. Speaking before a large crowd of Jesuits at 
Georgetown University on April 11 th, Dulles suggested that the American people had to 
choosε between peace and liberty, asserting that peace “ can be a cover whereby evil men can 
perpetrate diabolical wrongs." He then warned solemnly that “ craven purchase of peace at the 
expense of principle can result in destroying much of the human spirit on this planet" and 
“ could lead to a degradation of the human race" itself. l) 
That dramatic warning about the perils of peace was followed five days later by an 
announcement from the White House that the President would soon be subrnitting a special 
economic aid package to Congress to the tunε of $3.5 billion. On the 20th, as the conference 
got under way at Bandung, Eisenhower submitted his budget for the FY 55-56 with a message 
stating that the money would be used mostly for Asia, where “ threats" were most acutely fel t. 
Dubbed the “Arc of Free Asia," the aid package had its largest single sum earmarked for the 
Republic of Korea to help that war-tom nation with its recovery efforts, following its bloody 
warthathad εnded two years earlier. 
111 
Without Chinese entry into the co따lict on the side of North Korea, for which Beijing p떠d 
deariy with over 1.5 million lives, the war would have been over within a year of its 
commencement with a decisive victory for the United States and its South Korean allies. And 
along with that victory, the Korean people would have been reunified as a nation under the 
1) “Dulles Cautions on 'CravεnPeace"’(The New York Times 55/04/1 2), with the text ofthe speech. 
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banner ofthe United Nations. It was China’s entry that greatly complicated matters, forcing the 
United States to seek a truce rather than widen the conflict, as demanded by the UN 
commander, General Douglas MacArthur. In April of 1951 , in the face of mounting evidence 
of insubordination by MacArthur, President Truman had him relieved of his dutiεs， both as the 
Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers in Japan and as the UN commander in Korea. He 
was replaced by General Matthew Ridgway. 
When Eisenhower entered the White House in January of 1953 it was difficult to tell 
whether the war was still on in Korea, with the front-line constantly shifting back and forth 
along the 38th Parallel. Finally, in late spring that year Eisenhower decided to break the 
impasse by resorting to blackmail against Beijing and Pyongyang, demanding a quick 
negotiated settlement from them, if they wanted to avoid a nuclear attack from an adversary 
who was fast running out of patience. He had run for the presidency the previous year with a 
pledge to end the war. The war was oflìcially over in July that year without a victor, with the 
peninsula divided roughly where it had been since 1945. 
까le division of Korea at the 38th parallel was an American decision to which the Soviets 
gave their assent. The decision was made shortly after the second atomic bomb had been 
dropped, on Nagasaki, on the 9th of August, 1945. Just a day earlier, on the 8th, the Soviet 
Union had declared war on Japan, thereby fulfilling Marshal Stalin’ s pledge to President 
Roosevelt at Yalta that his country would join the Allies in Asia within three months of the end 
of the fighting in Euro야. Deplorable as the dropping of the atom bombs was, as it is to me 
personally, without it the war would have dragged on. The only question was for how much 
longer, that is, before Japan would have surrendered. And once the Soviεt Union had entered 
the war, which Stalin did in full compliance of his pledge, any prolongation of the conflict in 
the Pacific would have meant more lands falling to the Soviet Union. Within weeks, perhaps 
no more than a few, all of Korea would havε been taken by the Red Army. 
The Russians certai띠y had the necessary morale to gεt the job donε swiftly. Thεy had been 
waiting for a chance to avenge their humiliating defeat in the Battle of Tsushima in 1905, 
when they lost their entire Baltic Flεet in onε catastrophic εngagement with Admiral Togo’ s 
fleet, after they had dragged their war ships all the way from the Nor 
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Portsmouth brokered by President Theodore Roosevelt. 1t was their opportunity to settle old 
scores. The war of 1905 had erupted after a v매 fru띠l때 quarrel in that p따t of the world: three 
rεgional powers, Impεrial Russia, 1mperial China and 1mperial Japan, all laying claims on a 
defenseless little peninsular kingdom, Korea, styling itself an “ empire" - not wanting to stand 
out as an exception in a predatory neighborhood. 
When the Americans were closing in on Japan following a series of bloody naval 
engagements in the Pacific, the Russians were looking to the fortieth anniversary of their own 
bloody naval encounter with Japan. 1n early August, 1945, the commanders of the allied forces 
in the Pacific had their sights set on an amphibious assau1t on the island of Kyushu, starting on 
November 1, as their first step in their planned conquest of Japan. They had no plans for 
fighting the Japanese on the Asian mainland. Therefore, thε United States was in no position to 
dictate tεrms to the Soviet~ with regard to the pro뼈r disposition of Japan’s vast land forces 
scattered across southem Manchuria and Korea. 
The Korean people’ s traditional bittemess over the division of their country is all too 
understandable, particularly so because of the shockingly casual and playful manner in which 
the war planners at the Pentagon went about making their fateful decision on August 10th. on 
the other hand, thoughtful Koreans would weigh that just sentiment against the backdrop of the 
cold strategic realities of the day, which left the United States with few good options. 까le 
Allies ’ pledge to Iiberate Korea at the dεfeat of Japan would be honored. But once the Soviets 
had taken Korea in one big sweep, they would have declared that the joint mission had now 
been carried out. 
Thus, the decision to dividε the peninsula at the 38th parallel cannot be understood except in 
the context of an anticipaæd imminent Japanese surrender. It wa~ that sh따ed anticipation that 
led the Soviet leaders to conclude that half a loaf in Korea was a fair deal for them, inasmuch 
as they hadn't done any fighting in the Far East to deserve spoils of war. And, apparently, our 
war planners were willing to concede half of Korea to the Soviets as a goodwill gesture, 
because their principal concem was not to yield any p따t ofJapan. 
What ground forces the United States had at its disposal had to be deployed for the great 
assault on Kyushu. In thε meantime the Red Army was just over the other side of the 
Manchurian a 
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supplied with food and materiel off the Lend-Lease shipments from Alaskan ports that had 
continued after the surrender of Germany, perhaps in violation of intemationallaw goveming 
neutrality.2) 
After having suffered catastrophic losses in thε Pacific from Midway onward, while the 
Soviet Union continued to observe its neutrality in the war with Japan, the United States would 
certainly have been justified in declaring all of Korea its responsibility. And it is not clear that 
Stalin would necessarily have thrown tantrums over such a decision, whether by challenging it 
outright with troops or by making difficult demands elsewhere. Once Roosevelt had asked 
Stalin to jump in and help him win the war so as to limit American losses during the bleak 
days of the struggle in the Pacific, he was tying thε hands of his successor, Harry Truman, in 
dealing with an ally who would someday become a belligerent in the same conflict. 
IV 
The prevailing mood at Bandung was that despite the unsatisfactory conclusion of thε 
Korlεan War in 1953, the time had come for the nations of the world to move on and to deal 
with the pressing problems of the day, such as poverty, the anns race and colonialism. Most of 
the leaders seemed to have arrived with a sincere expectation of some gesture of good will 
from the United Statεs. What they got, however, was not a blessing from a friend but a pledge 
of economic assistance to promote “ Free Asia." That prompted some at the conference to 
complain that the United States was trying to pit nations against nations and that it was more 
interested in wrecking the conference than in helping needy nations. 
The American 1εadεrs’ hostility seemed to baft1e as much as to 뻐noy. There were those 
among the delegates who had come to think of the United States as a role-model to the former 
colonies because of the historical circumstances of its own founding. lndeed, without 
exception, the leaders of the participating nations were one-time anti-colonial fighters; many, 
2) For a good discussion of the 1941 Lend-Lease Act and the politics of its implementation during the 
war, see McCullough 1992. 
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such as Pandit Nehru, had spent the prime years of their lives in colonial prisons. 깐lese were 
the “ freedom fighters" of their generation, in the 1930s and ‘40s. 
of these one did his time as a young man in a Dutch jail in Bandung for his anti-colonial 
activities in the late 1920s and early 30s. Once Sukarno had risen in stature as a leader of 
Indonesia’ s independence movement, Imperial Japan was courting his friendship as it gobbled 
up the islands in the South Pacific during the early months of the Pacific War. The bond 
between the island paπiots and the Japanese Imperial Army remained strong right through the 
bitter military struggle between Japan and the Allies. Having rlεmained a steadfast fuend to the 
Indonesians throughout the conflict, the Japanε:se granted them their independence on June 1, 
1945, even as they were counting their last days as an empire. Indonesia would have its 
independence declared once more just two days aftεr Japan ’s surrender in August, with 
Sukarno at the helm as president, thereby adding legitimacy to his struggles. 
Now as the leader of the host-nation, Dr. Sukarno went out of his way in his wεlcoming 
remarks to call attention to thε unique place the United States occupiεd in world history as the 
beacon of hope for the subject nations. He told the assembled world leaders that the American 
people had the distinction of having won “the frrst successful anti-colonial war in history." 
Noting that April thε 18th was the very date that markεdthε start of the American Revolution 
in 1775, Sukarno invi때 the delegates to join with him in a pledge of an unwavering struggle 
until all the colonies were liberated in Asia and Africa. Recalling Lexington and Concord, the 
multilingual Indonesian president paraphrased a line from the poem “The Midnight Ride of 
Paul Revere" by declaring, “Yes, it shall echo forevermore! ,,3) 
까lÌs opening address was a moving tribute to America as well as an auspicious beginning 
for a great gathering. It was, in a sense, an American moment on the world stagε， made all the 
more remarkable because it had come right at the height of the Cold War in which the United 
States was an activε combatant. Only several days earlier America’s sεcretary of state, John 
Foster Dulles, had frred a shot across the bow, warning his nation, and presumably the whole 
world, that the United States was rather particular when it came to picking fuends, because, 
3) The conference was extensively covered by the American press, which included The New York 
Ti‘mes. All factual details in this essay, including direct quotes and attributions, are taken from news 
articles and editorials appearing in the Times duηng the month of Apri11955. 
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essentially, in his view, the world was made up of good forces and bad, with litt1e in between. 
There being no back-pedaling from Washington as the conference progressed, it was clear that 
the delegates wer，ε not going to get any show of support from their powerful and irritated 
neighbor. What they had heard thus far was “We’re watching you," and not “Wε h않ryou!" 
If there was one person at the conference who should not have been surprised by this turn of 
events, that was Premier Zhou, for he had been treatεd to some of this hostility and snobbεry 
when he attended the conference on lndochina held in Geneva the yεar before. The Geneva 
conference was, arguably, one of the least productive multilateral diplomatic efforts evεr 
known in the 20th century. 
까le leaders of the great powers met to settle the fate of the peoples of lndochina as the 
French were being driven out of their Vietnamese colony in the wake of their deflεat at 
Dienbienphu. Bewildered by what was happening in that part of the world, unable to 
comprehend what the future might hold in store for colonialism in Southeast Asia and 
elsewhere, these wεstεrn powεrs agrεεd on partitioning the nation of Viεtnam as their 
contribution to world order. 
But the 1εaders wεre far from united in their outlook. A pall of distrust and suspicion hung 
over the participants during much of the seventy-four-day long conference, coupled with a 
palpable resentment at the Unitεd States for its seeming determination to do absolutely nothing 
that was useful and constructive. Thε British foreign secretary Anthony Eden seemed to speak 
for many whεnhε said that he’d “ never known a conferencε of this kind." “πle p따ties would 
not make direct contact," he noted, adding how the participants “ were in constant danger of 
one or another backing out the door" (Karnow 1983, 199). 
Ashε would state in plain language aftεrwards ， addressing a group of invited guests, 
President Eisenhower was dead-set against helping thε Vietnamese people unify themselves as 
a nation except on Am떠can terms. He said that he had been warned by his experts that in a 
free nationwidε election 80% of the vote would go to the communist leader Ho Chi Min. He 
wouldn’t have any of that. The United States was refusing to participate in an international 
effoπ to help a formεr Fr，εnch colony become an indεpεndent， unifiεd nation, except as a 
potential American ally in thε cause of anti-communism. Defeating communism was 
Eise따lower’ s priority; national libεration or sel 
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willing to consider 
Not surprisingly, the conference at Geneva got off to a bad start. At the opening reception 
where plenipotentiaries mingled with plenipotentiaries, China’s Zhou Enlai made his maiden 
debut on the world stage, having previously dealt with his foreign counterp따ts only in bilateral 
settings, either as a host or as a guest. All eyes were on the man from Peking as he made his 
entrance into the reception hall. When he saw Secretary of State John Foster Dulles he went 
over to greet him with an extended hand. Would this be a tuming-point in the Cold War? Was 
it a thaw in the making? As the diplomats and reporters looked on, holding their breath, Mr. 
Dulles snubbed his Chinese nemesis by refusing to shak，ε his hand. 
Evidently mindful of the symbolism of that unusual encounter, but clearly unrepentant, the 
grumpy old man from Foggy Bottom was later heard to tell an associate not to worry, for the 
two might yet meet again someday, perhaps in a car crash! (Kamow 1983, 199). Within a year 
that menacing prophecy seemed to come true as hεads of state began filing in at Bandung from 
around the world. It would appear that sometime after Geneva Zhou became a marked man for 
the specialists in the “operations" dep따tment at the CIA, which was then under Allen Dulles, 
John Foster’s younger brother. With the announcement of the conference and the Chinese 
acceptance of the invitation from the Colombo Five, the CIA had found a “ target of 
opportunity." It was time to act, time to do something. 
V 
On Monday the 11 th an Air India “ Constellation" charter plane carrying a crew of seven 
with eleven passengers took off from the Hong Kong airport at 12: 15 pm en route to Jak따ta， 
Indonesia. Shortly thereafter the plane was blown out of the sky as it flεw ovεr the South 
China Sea north of Sarawak, killing all eleven passengers and four of the seven crewmembers. 
The three who survived the crash wεre able to relate their harrowing expεrience， telling how 
the plane had lost control owing to an explosion in one of the wings and how the flight crew 
had not observed anything out of the ordinary up to the moment of the explosion. 
Immediately, the Foreign Ministry in Beijing blasted the United States for allegedly having 
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used some of its many “agents" in Hong Kong, perhaps Chinese agents sympathetic to thε 
Nationalist govemment on Taiwan, to carry out this dastardly act. The U. S. govemment 
promptly dismissed the allegation as “preposterous". The New York Times jumped in with an 
editorial with its own independent opinion; it called the charge “VICIOUS". 
Just before the incident the Foreign Ministry in Beijing had, acting upon a tip, sent a 
telegram to the colonial govemment of Hong Kong asking them to be on the lookout for any 
suspicious movements at and around the a따)Ort， saying that there was a conspiracy afoot to 
tamper with aircraft carrying Chinese officials. Steps were indeed taken at the airport by the 
Hong Kong police to protεct this very aircraft, according to published reports releasεd 
immediately after thε tragedy. ηlÌs clearly seεmed to indicate that some type of foul play had 
been anticipated during the days immediately leading up to thε incident. Not surprisingly, the 
Chinese govemment bittεrly complained that the colonial govemment had not done enough to 
protεct the chartered aircraft despite the timely request. 
It has been arguεd by a string of writers on the subject of CIA covert operations, many of 
them former CIA officers, that 강10U had planned to be on that fateful f1ight and that his life 
was spared because he decided, only at the last minute, to wait for a later f1ight so that he might 
confer with Pr，εsident Nasser of Egypt on his way to Bandung. Zhou did in fact change his 
plans, and hε did, indeed, make a side-trip to Rangoon, Burma, to rendezvous with Nasser. But 
he would not havε bεεn on the ill-fated aircraft f1ying out of Hong Kong evεn if he hadn ’t 
made the changεs in his itinerary; the plane was carrying Zhou’s advance p따ty， and not his 
official entourage.4) 
It is now widely assumed that the frreball over the South China Sea on April 11 th was a CIA 
operation gone awry. The 1976 “final report" by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 
updating its 1975 “ interim report" on “ Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign 
Leaders," has an obscure referencε to some unspecified operation aimed at an “ East Asian 
leader." Although thε passage reads more like a denial than an admission, the reference was 
nevertheless deemed significant when the report was released, in the context of what was 
4) See Garwood 1985. 까lOugh on the whole most useful. this work falls under this category where it 
treats the circumstances of the ill-fated flight out of Hong Kong. 
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already known from open sources conceming the tlight out of Hong Kong. The timing of the 
inclusion of that reference in the 1976 report may have something to do with the delicacy of 
the subject matter. Premier Zhou was alive when the “m때m report" came out in 1975; he 
died in January the following year after having suffered with a terminal cancer since 1972. 5) 
lf the tragedy over the South China Sea was a bungled CIA job, it was probably a simple 
case of a poorly-planned operation, one that mistook one Air lndia ch따ter 빠craft for another. 
It was Air lndia’s four-engine “ Skymaster" which carried Zhou and his entourage of 20 to 
Rangoon on April 14th, coming in from Kunming. The plane that got blown up on the 11th, 
Air lndia “ Constellation," was a smaller aircraft. Most of the “ Constellation" passengers were 
Chinese officials and were all members of Zhou’s advance party, whose job it was to prεpare 
Bandung for their man before he arrived with his official entourage; the rest were foreign 
reporters. When 강10U arrived at Rangoon aboard “ Skymaster" his official entourage included 
the PRC' s vice premier, deputy foreign minister, minister of foreign πade and several heads of 
govemment agencles. 
강10U’ s decision to go to Rangoon frrst was of course known to President U Nu of Burma, 
who would go out to greet him. But there was an information blackout in the wake of the air 
disaster over the South China Sea; even Burma’ s president no longer knew exactly when his 
guest was arriving. U Nu was at the Rangoon airport with his own high entourage to greet 
Zhou, but when the aircraft touched down, Zhou was not on board; he had not boarded the 
flight at Kunming. Was he still planning to come? Then came the message that there was 
another flight coming in from Kunming; “ Skymaster" had just been cleared for approach. And 
there he was! We can very well imagine what the two men ’s ride back to the presidential 
palace must’ ve been like, starting with the host’s “ Now tell me all about it!" U Nu was later 
overheard to tell his Chinese guest that he should πY to relax. 
But relaxing cannot be an easy thing for someone who has reason to believe that he’s just 
survived an assassination plot. Zhou’s sensation might havε been one of utter exhilaration, if 
only he could have put the matter behind him as a bungled job and moved on. But he had no 
way of knowing that the hunt was now abandoned. Thε night bεfor，ε the entire Chinese 
5) 1 owe this thoughtful speculation to G따wood 1985, 62-64 
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entourage was to depart for Jakarta, lndonesia, en route to Bandung, 강lOU came up with an 
idea: he would depart ahead of schedule. 
As midnight approached, after the members of his diplomatic entourage had all retirεd into 
their respective hotel rooms, with plans for breakfast with their leader before boarding their 
flight out of Rangoon, Zhou called his personal aides to get ready in thirty minutes for a quiet 
ride to the a뼈ort， no questions asked. When the govemment officials assembled for breakfast 
the next moming, thεir leader was nowhere to be found; he had left Burma while they were 
sleeping and were now in Jakarta to do some sightseeing! 
Once inside lndonesia, far away from continental Asia, Premier Zhou seemed at last 
relaxed. He was found freely mingling with cheering crowds in the sπeets of Jakarta with 
minimal security escort; the crowds showered him with affection as if he wεre a movie star or 
a retuming war hero. He thought, perhaps, that he was finally out of danger. He could now 
look forward to the big show ahead in Bandung, 75 miles southeast of Jakarta. 
But there’s no good covert operation that do얹 not have a backup plan to accompany it. The 
CIA’ s plot on the life of Premier Zhou did st따t out with a backup plan, but it was abandoned. 
까le plan was to serve Zhou a bowl of rice at the f삶ewell banquet in Bandung with a dash of 
poison custom-designed for delayed action; Zhou would feel no effect for forty-eight hours. 
By thε time thε poison took effect, the intended victim would have been back in Bεijing for 
more than a day , too late to accusε anyone of foul play for his mortal affliction. As 1 
undεrstand it, this bizarre plan w없 abandoned for lack of intemal agency support, although 1 
have no way ofbeing sure that it was (Corson 1977, 356-66). 
VI 
Once the conference got under way the talk of the plane crash and the rumored assassination 
plot began to subside, slowly fading away in the delegates' consciousness, as they took up 
thεir positions and began tackling the official business at hand, both procεdural and 
substantive. From the outset there was tension between the neutralists and the anti-communist 
어lies of the United States. The anti-commur빠 delegates seemed resentful of having to justify 
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their status as America’s client states; they certainly did not appreciate the disdainful tone they 
detected in the remarks oftheir self-styled “ independent" neighbors. 
But they fought back, chiding their neighbors for failing to stand up to the repressive 
regimes next door while condemning westem imperialism. Within a day or two these pro-
westem leaders from Pakistan, Iran, Iraq, thε Philippines, etc., seemed to get the upper hand of 
the situation in this war of words, effectively tipping the balance in their favor. At least, that’s 
how it looked to The New York Times , which was moved to declare that what had started out 
as a potential “ disaster for thε Wεst" had now settled into a “ useful exercise in intemational 
rεlations." 
Ironically, while all this was going on, the man who rose in stature, assurning the role of a 
de facto leadεr， was none other than the man from China, whose inclusion at thε conference 
had been the very source of apprehension and hostility in some quarters. Zhou seemed to have 
made a conscious decision not to take notice of this sideshow over who was better than whom, 
knowing that there was no way he could come out of it unscathed; for, after all, it was the 
abuses inside Communist China that was what these people were arguing about. Why jump in 
whεn everyone seemed content to leave you alone? Zhou decided to lie low whenever thε two 
warring camps went after εach other. And that seemed to serve him well. “Reports rlεcεived 
here suggest," so went one 따ticle， “ that Prernier Chou Enlai of Communist China is the social 
lion ofthε conferencε 
Even though he was the leader of the world’ s largest democracy, Prime Minister Nehru had 
acquired some reputation back home for his disdain for parliamentary wrangling and for his 
impatience with interminable debates. Whether that reputation had preceded him to the 
conference or not, Mr. N랴ITU’ s annoyance with the proceedings was widely noticed by those 
partlclpatmg. 
Shortly after the conference had begun Nehru could see how some speakers liked to go on 
and on, and many dεlεgates could observe how the great man was reacting to this. Well into 
the conference, as the delegates were looking to the all-important plenary session, the Indian 
statesman seemed to make a serious blundεr by dεmanding that, in the interest of time, the 
speeches for the plenary session be filed for inclusion in the published proceedings but not be 
delivered orally. Hε found no one seconding his proposal. 
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Many of these delegates were looking forward to the last meeting, where they would be 
delivering their prepared speeches in their glorious native costumes, complete with matching 
hairpiεces. The suggestion that these delεgates retum home after filing copies of their prepared 
speeches, after having listened to others more inclined to speak than they, somehow came as a 
rude surprise. Quickly, surprise gave way to angεr. 까le secretary of state from Liberia said 
what everyone wanted to hear. “But we arε a small nation," said Mr. Momolu Dukuly, “and 
when we speak it is not often that anyone willlisten." Besides, he added, “We have come a 
long way to attend this conference and we would like to be heard." 
With an approving nod and a smile from thε gentleman from Peking, it was clεar that what 
needed to be said had been said. As Nehru retreated, taking his high-handed suggestion with 
him, everyone seemed happy again. All the head dεlεgates would get to speak now. 
Unfortunately, Pandit Nehru ’s πoubles did not end with this procedural dispute. From the 
outset there were signs of discontent directed at the great world-class peacemaker. An open 
challenge to his authority came from a fellow product of British education , Sir John 
Kotelawala, Ceylon’spnmε ministεr， in the form of a hint that the great Nehru had overplayed 
his hand as the unofficial leader of the proceedings. Realizing how much grief N랴1fU was 
getting, his loyal lieutenant V. K. Krishna Menon 1εaned over to the man sitting next to him, 
General Carlos Romulo of the Philipplines, and whispεred: “You will have to excuse the way 
my boss is acting here. He really is quitε inexpεriεnced as far as intemational conferences are 
concemed." 
Everything Nehru lacked in the way of “people skills" Premier Zhou seemed to have: 
humility, grace, patiεncε and reassuring accessibility. He was a diplomat who knew his craft. 
He wanted to win people’ s hearts and minds without threats and without talking down .to them 
And he was always busy talking to fellow diplomats. One night he went to see Menon at the 
latter’ s quarters, arriving there at midnight; he was found leaving at 3 am. 
The day before the adjoumment Zhou threw a bombshell of an announcement: that his 
govemment was now rlεady for a meeting with the United States - for “ direct bilateral talks," 
a~ opposed to a “multi-power conference," so 피s spokesman clarified to the prl엉s afterwards -
to discuss all outstanding issues that stood bεtwεen the two nations. It had all the appearance of 
a breakthrough; the Chinese leader was now prepared to sit down with his American 
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counterp따t to discuss their diffel'εnces， and there were no pr'εconditions. 
The delegates were ove낀oyed. The prime minister of P때istan ， America’s military ally, 
Mohammed Ali, thought Zhou’ s offer was an “excellent thing." Prince Faisal, Premier of 
Saudi Arabia, remarkεd of Zhou: “ He seems a man of very good character." Or, as Prime 
Minister Margaret Thatchεr would say of Mi암lail Gorbachev some three decades later, 
following their first meeting at Number 10 Downing Street when the Russian leader was not 
yet the head of his govemment, “1 think we can do business with him." lndeed, “1 think we can 
believε him" were the words the reporters heard from Saleh Akil, a member of the Syrian 
dεlεgation ， who then noted: “ His whole attitude here has been one of leniency and 
conciliation. " 
But 강10U got no response from the United States. He did eventually gεtto sh외(e hands with 
an American secretary of state, but that was not for another seventeen years, after the United 
States had changed its course on the issue of UN membership. From 1950 to 1971 Beijing’s 
application for UN membership was blocked by the United States at every session, which 
ensured the continued presence of the Nationalist govemment on the Security Council as one 
of the five veto-wiεlding permanent members. But in 1971 the United States decided to 
abandon that policy , thereby allowing the Genεral Assembly to admit the PRC as a 
replacement of the Republic of China in the world body. After relenting on the replacement 
issue the Nixon administration tried to get the General Assembly to let Taiwan keep its seat in 
the Assembly alongside the PRC, though not on thε Sεcurity Council. 까1at motion failed. The 
govemment on Taiwan was εxpelled from the world body by a vote of 76 to 35 with 17 
abstentions. 
When Premier Zhou and President Nixon signed the historic “Shanghai Communique" the 
following year, normalizing relations betw∞n the two great powers and pledging themselves 
to a “ One China" policy, China had barely begun its intemal house-cleaning after several years 
of crippling ideological madness known as the “ Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution." 
President Nixon and his secretary of state, Dr. Henry Kissinger, had calculated that 
normalizing relations with Asia’ s most potent check on Soviet power was in Amεnca’ s 
national interest, and China’s intemal troubles hardly entered into their calculations. 
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VII 
It is difficult to know what all was going through Premier Zhou’s mind at the Bandung 
Conference, when he was courting the friendship of his fellow diplomats, urging everyone to 
come visit him. But we can safely assume that he wanted to get some trade relations 
established quickly with various Middle Eastem and African nations, starting with Egypt, 
whose young ruler seemed to fascinate him greatly. And he was only too glad to offer aid and 
encouragement to any colonial peoples willing to put up a fight to gain their freedom and 
independence, which a succession of American presidents looked upon with some 
apprehension. Whatever the actual impact of the PRC' s Third World diplomacy, the fivε-year 
period from the Bandung Conference to 1960 was nothing short of remarkable for the global 
de-colonization process, which gave us 40 new members in the General Assembly, including 
most ofthe African nations as we know them today. 
A brief rlεtum to the conference may give us some further flavor of what went on there in 
that remarkable week in 1955, at the height of the Cold War, in a city of one mil1ion, much 
favored by tourists, pεrched on the breathtakingly beautiful Preanger Plateau, surrounded by 
luxuriant towering peaks. In the evenings the delegates actively socialized, dining out and 
e매oying thεmsεlves. The key playεrs took tums hosting speci떠 dinners for invited guests at 
their quarters. Premier Zhou had one dinner scheduled for the night before the final banquet. 
At that party the guests were polite1y asked not to talk business; 1 would guess that he urged his 
guests to get better acquainted, since they ’d all be heading home soon. 
Apparεntly， the guests obliged. ‘'Thε nearest thing to political discussion at the dinner," so 
reported one joumalist, was a “ renewed invitation from Mr. Chou to all his guests to visit 
China." He had been seen inviting people to visit him in China ever since his arrival at the 
conference, starting with Col. Nasser. Zhou appears to have seen 때 important potential ally in 
Nasser since before the two had arrived at the conference. It was Prime Minister Nasser, not 
yet president, that Zhou had gone to meet at Rangoon, and Zhou was found urging the 
Egyptian leader to visit China more than once before the conference adjoumed. Nasser was 
said to have responded each time with a smile. 
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Throughout the conferencε Zhou showed a talent for making all participating delegates feel 
that they were important and that they had his sympathetic ear. They were given the 
impression that this man from China was genuinely interested in hearing what they had to say. 
As an unofficial f1oor-manager he seemed keen in disceming consensus amid disagreements, a 
remarkable feat considering his language barrier. Zhou spoke French but not English; and 
English was the lingua franca for the occasion. And Zhou had both the humility and self-
assurance needed to credit fellow leaders with anything that sεεmed worth noting and 
celebrating. 
In the end, it was Zhou’ s masterful diplomacy that seemed to rescue the conference from 
slipping into irrεlevancy with an acrimonious contest of will between two unyielding blocs: the 
neutrals poking fun at the client-states and thε anti-comrnunists chiding the neutrals for failing 
to recognize Red China for what it was, i. e. , a vast, suffocating, totalitarian labor camp 
undergoing imrnense suffering. 
Asthε delegates prepared to depart it was clear to 외1 that the conference had been more than 
a harrnless “exercise in intemational relations." πle important thing about the conference was 
not thε communique itself or Zhou’ s own “ Five Principles," his agenda for peaceful 
coexistence, which was warrnly embraced by all, much to the chagrin of our Statε Dεpartment. 
Rather, it was the demonstration that these former colonies of Asia and Africa were quite 
capable of a constructive dialogue on their own and that they might in the coming years havε 
something to offer in the way of promoting a peaceful and just world order, one which had 
eluded them as the military competition between thε supεrpowers intensified. And they 
seemεd agreed that in Zhou Enlai the right kind of leader had come along to help get the 
much-needed conversatÍon going. 
Zhou had oncε grεatly impressed General George C. Marshall when Marshall was 
mediating between the two warring factions during the Chinese civil war, the Nationalists and 
the Comrnunists. The superlative “ the greatest statesman of our time," describing Zhou Enlai, 
may havε started with Marshall. Years later another Secretary of State, Dr. Henry Kissinger, 
would match Marshall’s superlative with one of his own, in the wakε of the famous “ Ping 
Pong Diplomacy" that led to the normalization of relations between the United States and 
China some seventeen yεars atì 
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impressive," said the American sch이ar-statesman as he spokε to a friend, adding, “What a 
mind!" (Hersh 1983, 492). 
VIII 
Zhou Enl떠 died in January of 1976 at the agε of78. When 1 visited China in 1982, the frrst 
of sεven 띠ps to China over thε years, 1 was t떠king to a group of Chinese people at TiεnAn 
Men Square just outsidε the famous gate leading to the Forbidden City. 까1εywεre telling me 
what their late leader Zhou Enlai had mεant to them in life and what great affection and esteem 
he had enjoyed in their‘ hearts all through their lives. It was clear that Zhou had bεεn very much 
a people’s statesman, like no othεr. Then, the talk shifted to the dεath of another great leader in 
September of that same year, the father of the People’s Republic, or, as he would allow his 
people to call him whilε he was alive, the “Great HεImsman." The crowd recalled a very long 
line of moumers filing to have a glimpse of their beloved Chairman Mao Iying in state. 1 
couldn ’t resist wanting to know if they remember，εd a line of moumers for Premier Zhou as 
well, givεn that it was winter when he died. “Oh， yεs!" came the answer. “ But was the line just 
as long?" 까len， after they’d looked at one another as if to search for the best answer possible, 
thεy a1lowed one of thεm to rεply， “ Oh, Yεs!" Then, another one jumped in to say, “ No, no, 
much longer!" “Much longer," it was agreed. 
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